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PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CORIZON HEALTH CARE, 
INC.; STEVEN GLUNT, Superintendent; DEBRA YOUNKIN, Corrections Health Care 
Administrator; MUHAMMAD NAJI, Doctor; MANDY CORMAN, Physician Assistant;  
MARIA LEAHY, Physician Assistant; MARVIN BRANTO, Physician Assistant; JOHN 




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00246) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 26, 2017 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 





                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Lee Stewart appeals pro se from the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.  As the appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Stewart initiated this § 1983 action in 2013 against several prison officials and 
medical personnel from the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale,1 in addition to 
Corizon Health Care, then a contractual medical service provider to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, alleging that these Defendants denied him adequate medical 
care in connection with a left ankle injury he suffered while playing basketball. 
 Stewart claimed that he suffered the injury on July 10, 2012, and was seen the next 
day in the facility medical department by Nurse Branto, who diagnosed him with a 
sprain, and provided an ice pack, a wrap, and crutches.  The following day, Stewart 
returned to the medical department and was seen by Physician Assistants Corman and 
Leahy, who, after an X-ray analysis, confirmed the diagnosis of a sprain.  The next day, 
Stewart submitted a request to be seen by the medical department because “his foot 
looked worse,” but was not seen until five days later by an unnamed Physician Assistant, 
                                                                
1 Stewart named the following medical personnel, referred to below as the “Medical 
Defendants” – Marvin Branto and Rich Clark, registered nurses at SCI Houtzdale; Maria 
Leahy and Mandy Corman, Physician Assistants at SCI Houtzdale; and Dr. Muhammad 
Naji, the Medical Director at SCI-Houtzdale. Stewart also named SCI-Houtzdale 
Superintendent Steven Glunt, Corrections Healthcare Administrator Debra Younkin, and 
Corizon Health Care Chief Executive Officer Rich Hallsworth. 
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who allegedly took away Stewart’s crutches, advising him that there was nothing wrong 
with his foot.  Stewart returned to the medical department the next day, July 19, 2012, 
and following another X-ray, Leahy diagnosed him with an acute fracture, placed him in 
a cast, re-issued crutches, and provided Tylenol for pain.  She referred Stewart to Dr. Naji 
for care of his fracture, and Naji completed a consultation on August 1, 2012, 
recommending that the cast be removed in three weeks.  Leahy saw Stewart on August 
28, 2012, and removed his cast, but because of insufficient callus formation, she ordered 
him to come back a week later to reapply the cast.  Leahy reapplied the cast on 
September 6, 2012, and Dr. Naji removed it 11 days later after observing sufficient callus 
formation.  
On September 28, 2012, Stewart went to sick call complaining of a foot fungus 
and ankle pain when running.  Corman prescribed Tinactin and ordered Stewart to wear 
an ankle sleeve during physical activity.  Between December 2012 and February 2013, 
Stewart continued to complain of foot fungus and pain, and was provided Tinactin and X-
rays, which revealed no additional damage.  Dr. Naji treated Stewart on February 23, 
2013, and observed that the fracture had healed completely, with no significant pain or 
swelling.  He ordered physical therapy and a lace-up ankle support for two months.  
Stewart attended at least two physical therapy consultations – in June and August of 2013 
– and those consultations revealed a full range of motion and normal strength in his 
ankle.  After his August 2013 physical therapy consultation, medical records indicate that 
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he was seen only for complaints related to his fungal infection, for which he was 
provided various antifungal medications. 
 Early in the litigation, acting pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
the District Court dismissed Defendants Glunt, Younkin, Corizon Health Care, and Rich 
Hallsworth – because they lacked sufficient personal involvement in Stewart’s care – but 
permitted Stewart to proceed against the Medical Defendants.  The District Court 
ultimately awarded summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants, concluding 
that they provided Stewart adequate, and reasonably prompt, medical treatment, and thus 
Stewart could not establish that they acted with deliberate indifference.  This timely 
appeal ensued.2 
II. 
   We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) using the same test the District Court applied and ask 
whether the complaint has “sufficient factual matter[,] accepted as true[,] to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on [its] face.”  Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  We also exercise plenary 
                                                                
2 On March 15, 2016, the District Court entered an order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s 
February 9, 2016, Report and Recommendation, and awarding summary judgment in 
favor of the Medical Defendants.  After the District Court entered judgment, Stewart filed 
objections to the Report and Recommendation, which the District Court overruled by 
order entered March 29, 2016.  Stewart timely filed two notices of appeal – one from the 
March 15, 2016, order (at C.A. No. 16-1897), and the other from March 29, 2016, order 




review over the District Court’s award of summary judgment and apply the same test the 
District Court utilized – whether the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may summarily affirm any 
decision of the District Court when “it clearly appears that no substantial question is 
presented.”  3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2015). 
 As to Defendants Younkin and Glunt, Stewart claimed that Younkin denied his 
request for an MRI at an unspecified time and that Glunt was “notified of [his] ongoing 
pain and suffering,” but failed to take appropriate action.  Stewart does not allege that 
either Defendant was otherwise personally involved in any of his care decisions.  Put 
another way, Stewart claimed that these Defendants, supervisory officials who do not 
participate in individual medical care decisions, simply failed to intervene in his medical 
care.  Such a claim is not viable under the Eighth Amendment.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 
F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that 
prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-
medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter 
requirement of deliberate indifference.”).  Thus the District Court properly dismissed 
these Defendants.3 
                                                                
3 Even if these Defendants were sufficiently personally involved in Stewart’s care, his 
claims against them would still fail because it is clear from the complaint that he received 
substantial medical care, and “[m]ere disagreement as to the proper course of medical 
treatment” is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235; 
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 As to the substance of Stewart’s care, in awarding summary judgment in favor of 
the Medical Defendants, the District Court accurately observed that Stewart “received no 
less than seventeen evaluations by medical personnel at SCI Houtzdale, two orthopedic 
consultations, three physical therapy consultations, numerous prescriptions for pain and 
anti-fungal medications, and five x rays,” and that “[t]here is no evidence that any 
Defendant failed to give him care when it was requested.”  To the extent that Stewart 
complained about the adequacy of these interventions, his claims fail as a “[m]ere 
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment.”  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235.   
 He also complained, however, about the timeliness of the interventions – that 
Defendants initially misdiagnosed his fracture, resulting in its delayed treatment.  But 
such a diagnostic failure, at worst, amounts to to medical malpractice, which is not 
actionable under the Eighth Amendment.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“[M]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 
because the victim is a prisoner.”).  In addition, he pointed to a five-day period following 
his misdiagnosis during which he received no treatment – despite his request for it – and 
claimed to have been in significant pain.  But deliberate indifference requires that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
see also Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Where the plaintiff has 
received some care, inadequacy or impropriety of the care that was given will not support 
an Eighth Amendment claim.”).  The District Court properly dismissed Corizon Health 
Care and its CEO, Rich Hallsworth, for essentially the same reason – supervisory liability 
under § 1983 may exist only when there is an underlying constitutional violation.  See 
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing “two 
general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts 




defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” and to 
avert summary judgment, Stewart “must point to some evidence beyond [his] raw claim 
that [Defendants were] deliberately indifferent.”  Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 
F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).  This, he has not done.   
Although we do not doubt that a fractured ankle constitutes a serious medical 
need, see Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (medical need is serious if non-treatment results in “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain”), Stewart has not even alleged – let alone pointed to evidence – that 
Defendants were actually aware of this condition during the five-day period in question.  
The record indicates, instead, that Defendants were under the mistaken impression – 
based on an improper reading of the X-rays – that he was suffering from only a sprain, 
and treated him accordingly.  Stewart claimed, in effect, that they should have known of 
his more serious condition, but this is not enough to establish deliberate indifference.  See 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (“[O]fficial’s failure to alleviate a 
significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” is not actionable under the 
Eighth Amendment).  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District 
Court. 
